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Aviall Services v. Cooper Industries:
Implications for the United States' Liability
Under CERCLA, The "Superfund Law"
SOPHIA STRONG*
Editor's Note: As this issue of the Hastings Law Journal was going to
print, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 125 S.Ct. 577 (Dec. 13, 2004).
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's en banc panel decision
and held that a private party who has not been sued in a CERCLA
administrative or cost recovery action may not obtain contribution
from other liable parties under CERCLA section I 13(f). This decision
does not diminish the importance of this note, however. In its opinion,
the Supreme Court declined to address whether, as an alternative to an
action for contribution under section I I3(f), a private party could
recover its clean-up costs under CERCLA section io7(a)(4)(B). Many
of the legal and policy arguments proposed here as support for section
1i 3 (f) independent contribution actions between potentially
responsible parties also support a CERCLA section io7(a)(4)(B)
independent contribution right. Moreover, at the very least, this note
emphasizes the practical and policy implications that the Supreme
Court's ruling against section I I3 (f) independent contribution actions
between potentially responsible parties will likely have on the efficacy
of CERCLA statute generally, and our health and environment as a
whole.
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA")' in 198o "to facilitate the
prompt clean-up of hazardous sites and to shift the cost of environmental
response from the taxpayers to the parties who benefited from the wastes
that caused the harm."2 CERCLA is often celebrated as "a vital program
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2oo5. The author
would like to thank Brian Haughton and Jon Lycett of Barg, Coffin, Lewis and Trapp, LLP for their
ideas, input and generous contributions of time and energy to this article. She would also like to thank
John Stanley, David Ward, and the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for their hard work, as well as
her family and fianc6 Marc for their encouragement along the way.
i. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of
1980,42 U.S.C. §§ 96Ol-9675 (2ooo).
2. OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., Iti6 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th Cir. 1997).
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to safeguard human health and the environment from the toxic
consequences of decades of irresponsible waste handling."3
In Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services,4 the 2004 Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address whether CERCLA provides a mechanism
for potentially responsible parties to collect clean-up costs from each
other in section 113 private contribution actions, independent of EPA
administrative orders to compel clean-up under section io6(a),5 or cost
recovery actions under section 107(a)(4)(A).6 Aviall is one of the most
significant CERCLA cases issued in recent years. In addition to the
generally negative effects a ruling against independent private
contribution actions would have on the efficacy of CERCLA-such as
discouraging voluntary clean-ups of contaminated sites-a ruling against
independent private contribution actions would also virtually exempt the
federal government and its entities from liability for toxic pollution.
Part I of this note will describe the controversy between Aviall
Services and Cooper Industries and its progression through the federal
courts. Part II of this note will highlight the United States' conflicting
interests in the outcome of Aviall. Although the United States had no
direct involvement in the Aviall controversy, the relationship of
CERCLA's section I I3' contribution remedy to the statute as a whole
carries two competing implications for the United States in its capacities
as a CERCLA regulated entity and potential contribution defendant,
and the enforcer of the CERCLA statute. Despite the federal
government's role as an entity charged with effectuating CERCLA's
statutory purpose of prompt environmental clean-up, the Department of
Justice's position throughout the Aviall controversy appears primarily
designated to defend the United States as a potential contribution
defendant.
Part III of this note will highlight the reasons why the Supreme
Court should not accept the Department of Justice's arguments against
interpreting CERCLA to provide an independent right of contribution
between potentially responsible parties. Substantial legal authority and
public policy reasons support a Supreme Court ruling in favor of
independent contribution rights. First, federal common law, the
legislative history of section 113(f),8 CERCLA practice, and court of
appeals interpretations consistently support a CERCLA independent
3. Black's Law Dictionary 239 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting John G. Sprankling & Gregory S. Weber,
The Law of Hazardous Waste and Toxic Substances in a Nutshell, 256 (1997)).
4. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 2OO), rev'd en banc, 312
F.3d 677 (5th CQr. 2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 02-1192).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 96o6(a) (2000).
6. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
7. Id. § 9613.
8. Id. § 961 3 (f).
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contribution right. Public policy also supports a CERCLA independent
contribution right because a ruling against independent private
contribution actions would virtually exempt the federal government and
its entities from liability for toxic pollution. State laws and other federal
statutory schemes do not provide adequate or reliable alternative
remedies for private parties to recover clean-up costs from the federal
government responsible for its hazardous pollution.
I. BACKGROUND-THE AVIALL CASES
A. THE AVIALL DISPUTE
In 1981, Aviall Services, Inc. ("Aviall") purchased an aircraft engine
maintenance business in Dallas, TX from Cooper Industries, Inc.
("Cooper Industries").9 Several years later, Aviall discovered that the
property had extensive soil and groundwater contamination. I° The Texas
National Resource Conservation Commission ("TNRCC"), a state
agency, learned of the contamination and repeatedly urged Aviall to
clean up the property or be subject to a CERCLA enforcement action."
In response to the threats from TNRCC, Aviall voluntarily cleaned up
the four sites that constituted the business. 2 The EPA neither contacted
Aviall nor designated Aviall's property as contaminated. 3
In order to recover from Cooper Industries some of the millions of
dollars it incurred in clean-up costs, Aviall sued Cooper Industries in
Texas district court seeking contribution under CERCLA and damages
under state law theories.'4 Both Cooper Industries and Aviall conceded
that they were potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") under
CERCLA.'5 The district court granted summary judgment for Cooper
Industries on Aviall's claim, accepting Cooper Industries' argument that,
based on a literal interpretation of the CERCLA statute, a CERCLA
PRP must first be subject to either a CERCLA section io6 governmental
clean-up order or a CERCLA section Io7(a) private or governmental
cost recovery action before it may bring a CERCLA contribution claim.'6
Accordingly, Aviall could not bring a section 113 contribution action
against Cooper Industries to recover the millions of dollars in clean-up
costs it incurred by voluntarily cleaning up Cooper Industries' earlier
pollution of the property because Aviall cleaned up the contaminated
9. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 20OI), rev'd en banc, 312






15. Id at 137.
i6. Id at 136.
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property without the EPA issuing a CERCLA section io6 administrative
order to compel Aviall to clean up the site, and because Aviall was not
subject to a private or governmental cost recovery action under
CERCLA section io7. In other words, under CERCLA as interpreted by
the district court, Cooper Industries did not have to compensate Aviall
for its share of the clean-up costs, even though Cooper Industries
admitted that it had contributed to the contamination Aviall paid to
clean up. Aviall appealed.
B. THE FIRST AVIALL APPEAL
On appeal, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Texas
district court's holding that "a PRP seeking contribution from other
PRPs under § II3(f)(I) must have a pending or adjudged § io6
administrative order or § io7(a) cost recovery action against it.' 7 The
Fifth Circuit panel's reasoning against independent PRP contribution
claims rested on the panel's strict textual interpretation of CECRLA
section I 13(f).' The panel read the first sentence of i13(f) to require a
PRP to file a contribution action only "during or following" a federal
CERCLA action against the party or one of the other PRPs.'9 The panel
interpreted the word contribution to "require[] a tortfeasor to first face
judgment before it can seek contribution from other parties," and the
term "may" in the first sentence of section II3(f) to create "an exclusive
cause of action [meaning] 'shall' or 'must.'
2 0
The Aviall three-judge panel also interpreted the final sentence of
section I 13(f), called the "savings clause," "to mean that the statute does
not affect a party's ability to bring contribution actions based on state
law. '2' The panel believed that interpreting the savings clause to allow
independent contribution suits between PRPs would "render superfluous
the first sentence of section Ii3(f)(I), the enabling clause" and thus
would violate traditional canons of statutory construction providing that
specific statutory provisions may not govern general statutory provisions,
if the two provisions conflict.2
Despite the textual approach of the majority, the Aviall panel
dissent highlighted that "the great majority of circuit courts implicitly
reject the... majority's conclusion," and that the legislative history of
section I 13(f) and public policy support independent contribution suits
between PRPs 3 Not surprisingly, Aviall requested a rehearing en banc.
17. Id at 145 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
i& Id. at 138-4o.
iq. Id.
20. Id at 138-39.
21. Id. at 139.
22. Id at 139-40.
23. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 68o (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
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C. THE AVIALL EN BANC DECISION
The Fifth Circuit granted Aviall's petition for rehearing en banc
because of the "importance of this question to the allocation of financial
responsibility for CERCLA clean-ups."' The en banc court essentially
adopted dissenting panel Judge Wiener's alternative interpretation of
section 113(0 " that a PRP may sue at any time for contribution under
federal law to recover costs it has incurred in remediating a CERCLA
site. 5 The en banc panel held that "[s]ection I13(f)() authorizes suits
against PRPs in both its first and last sentence which states without
qualification that 'nothing' in the section shall 'diminish' any person's
right to bring a [CERCLA] contribution action in the absence of a section
io6 or section io7(a) action.' '26 The en banc panel also found the three-
judge panel's textual interpretation of section 1 13(f) flawed because it
"fails to make sense against the background of case law and other
interpretive guideposts," such as the traditional canons of statutory
interpretation.'
Indeed, the en banc panel based much of its reasoning on the
importance of following the preexisting federal common law right of
contribution. It also considered Congress' intent to encourage cost-
sharing and give PRPs the explicit right to sue, as emphasized in the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA") 8
amendments to CERCLA, including the section I 13(f ) provision.29
Under CERCLA as interpreted by the Aviall en banc panel, Cooper
Industries had to compensate Aviall for its share of the clean-up costs
because Cooper Industries contributed to the contamination Aviall paid
to clean up. Cooper Industries petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari."
II. THE CONFLICT-THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S AMICUS BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF CERTIORARI AND ARGUING AGAINST AN INDEPENDENT
RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE PARTIES
Shortly after Cooper Industries petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed an amicus brief
("DOJ brief") in support of Cooper Industries' petition.3' Although the
24. Id.
25. Id at 68o-8i.
26 Id at 681 (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-499, ioo Stat. 1613,
ch. V, 517(c)(I) (1986).
29. Aviall, 312 F.3d at 682-85.
3o. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc, 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2oo2), petition for cert. filed,
2003 WL 23 015 03 5 (U.S. Feb. 12, 2003) (No. 02-1192).
31. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., I24 S.Ct. 981
(2004) (No. 02-1192), 2003 WL 22977858 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2003).
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United States had no direct involvement in the Aviall controversy, the
federal government has a tremendous stake in the outcome of the Aviall
case. As a CERCLA regulated entity, and the enforcer of the CERCLA
statute, the United States has strong competing interests in the outcome
of the Court's interpretation of CERCLA's section 113.32 Indeed, the
federal government "wears two hats in this [situation]: one as a potential
contribution defendant eager to limit CERCLA's scope to protect the
public purse, and another as the entity charged with effectuating
CERCLA's salutary purposes to advance the public interest in prompt
environmental clean-ups."'33
A. THE UNITED STATES AS A REGULATED ENTrY AND PRP UNDER
CERCLA
The relationship of CERCLA's contribution remedy to the statute
as a whole has clear implications for the United States as a potentially
responsible party under CERCLA. CERCLA section 120 contains a
sovereign immunity waiver, subjecting the federal government and its
agencies to removal and remedial actions under the statute and state
law.' CERCLA's sovereign immunity waiver ensures that, like other
private entities, the federal government may be subject to CERCLA
liability for reckless disposal of hazardous substances. Indeed, the federal
government is a CERCLA PRP at a significant number of sites. And
among government agencies, the Department of Defense ("DOD"), the
largest owner of infrastructure in the world, is in a class by itself. "[A]s a
result of 2 centuries of testing, training, and weapons manufacturing,
[ranging] from unexploded bombs to nuclear waste," the DOD has
created a "toxic legacy.., in the United States."35 "The [DOD] is, in fact,
the world's largest polluter, producing more hazardous waste per year
than the five largest U.S. chemical companies combined." 6
Not only were there at least 158 federally-owned or operated
Superfund sites marked for clean-up and remediation under CERCLA
as of 2002,"7 but also an additional "12,000 contaminated sites at more
32. Second Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at I, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc.,
124 S.Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 02-1192), 2004 WL 354181 (U.S. Feb. 23,2004).
33. Brief of Appellant Aviall Services, Inc. in Response to Brief of the United States as Anicus
Curiae at i, Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002) (No. oo-bo197), 2002
WL 32o99831 (5th Cir. Jul. 3, 2002).
34. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 962o(a)(i), (a)(4) (2000).
35. I49 CoNG. REc. HI9O9-o4, HI9o9-1o (2003) (statement of Rep. Blumenaur).
36. Bob Feldman, War on the Earth, DOLLARS & SENSE, Mar./Apr. 2003, at 24.
37. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-o3-850, SUPERFUND PROGRAM: CURRENT STATUS AND
FUrURE FISCAL CHALLENGES (2003). See also The Impact of Environmental Laws Upon Military
Training Procedures and Upon the Nation's Defense Security: Hearing Before the Commission on
Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, io8th Cong. 4-5 (2003) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Sen. James M. Jeffords) (emphasizing that in 20o3 there were at least 13o DOD
Superfund sites marked for CERCLA clean-up and remediation).
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than 700 active and recently-closed military bases throughout country. ' ',8
The federal government faced $3o7 billion in environmental liabilities at
the end of fiscal year 200I." Even President Bush has recognized the
breadth of federal and DOD pollution, stating in a campaign speech in
April 2002 that the federal government produces more toxic waste than
any other organization in the nation.'0
Because the DOD is the world's largest polluter,4' the United States
has a significant interest in limiting CERCLA's scope to "protect the
public purse," and reducing the instances in which the United States
must compensate other parties for their clean-up costs. A Supreme Court
ruling limiting the timing of section i 3 contribution actions would cause
the federal government to defend far fewer CERCLA contribution suits,
and be subject to much less liability for its environmental pollution. Like
Cooper Industries in the Aviall dispute, the United States would save
millions of dollars at every voluntary clean-up site where it is potentially
responsible for contamination if the Supreme Court determines that
CERCLA does not provide for independent contribution actions.
Additional cost concerns for the United States and other potential
large-scale CERCLA defendants include several practical disadvantages.
Where no governmental agency orders or supervises a clean-up,
permitting a suit for contribution may "create a risk" that a large-scale
defendant will be exposed to double or multiple liability if a government
agency decides later that it must bring its own action to ensure the
adequate clean-up of the contaminated site.' Further, an independent
right of contribution between potentially responsible parties could also
subject the United States and other CERCLA defendants to
contribution suits at any time, with no express statute of limitation
period.43
The United States thus has a fundamental interest in the
interpretation of the timing of contribution claims under CERCLA
because it is a regulated entity at a vast number of contaminated sites
throughout the country. A Supreme Court ruling in favor of independent
PRP contribution actions could increase the United States' liability for its
past disposals of hazardous substances tremendously, resulting in an
immense drain on the public purse.
38. Elizabeth Book, Services Promote Pollution-Prevention Efforts, NATIONAL DEFENSE
MAGAZINE, Oct. 2001, at www.nationaldefensemagazine.orgarticle.cfn?Id--617.
39 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-o3-219, LoNG-TERm CoMmirMENTS: IMPROVING rHE
BUDGETARY Focus ON ENVIRONMENTAL UABILmES (2003).
40. Hearings, supra 37, at 4-5 (statement of Sen. James M. Jeffords). See also r49 CONG. REC.
HI9O9-o4 , Hi9o9-Io (2003) (statement of Rep. Blumenaur).
41. 149 CONG. REC. HI9O9-O4, HI 9 O9-io (2003) (statement of Rep. Blumenaur).
42. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 17-18, AvialU Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312
F-3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1192), 2002 WL 32o99835 (5th Cir. June 19, 2002).
43. Id at I8.
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B. THE UNITED STATES AS THE ENFORCER OF CERCLA
In contrast, for the EPA, the agency designated CERCLA's
"substantial clean-up authorities," the costs of a Supreme Court ruling in
favor of Cooper Industries are numerous.' A Supreme Court decision in
favor of Cooper Industries Would slow the clean-up of contaminated
properties generally, slow the reallocation of clean-up costs from less
culpable to more culpable PRPs, as well as discourage the voluntary
expenditure of PRP funds on clean-up activities.45
Section io7 of CERCLA authorizes the EPA, in theory, to clean-up
and remediate hazardous sites whenever necessary. 46 Yet the federal
government's limited human and budgetary resources severely constrain
the EPA's ability to monitor the numerous hazardous sites throughout
the country and initiate clean-up operations on a nation-wide basis.47
Under the original CERCLA legislation, much of the EPA's money to
clean up contaminated sites came from a trust financed by taxes on
chemical and oil companies. 48 Congress allowed those taxes to expire in
I995. 4' Additionally, "Superfund program money from all sources has
declined by a third in inflation-adjusted dollars since 1993, according to a
General Accounting Office report" released in February 2004.50 "EPA
officials acknowledge that a tight budget forces them to balance the cost
of cleaning up a site against the risk to the public if nothing is done."
5'
Congress repeatedly- recognizes that the EPA does not have the
resources to initiate as many full-scale CERCLA clean-ups as are
necessary." As a result, clean-up actions progress at an unacceptably
slow pace. Indeed, citing budget concerns, the Bush Administration has
proposed new sites for the Superfund program at a much slower rate
than previous administrations. 3
Based upon the EPA's limited clean-up resources, a Supreme Court
ruling denying PRPs independent contribution actions will slow the
clean-up and remediation of hazardous sites under CERCLA. A
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 96o4(a) (200o); Exec. Order No. 12,58o, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987).
45. See H.R. REP. No. 96-ioI6(1), at i (98o), reprinted in I98O U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-2o, 6132;
Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd, 804 F.2d 1454, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 96o7.
47. Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1465 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 736 (I986) (Burger, C.J.) (noting in opinion invalidating section 251 of the Gramm-Rudman
Act, "[n]o one can doubt that Congress and the President are confronted with fiscal and economic
problems of unprecedented magnitude").




52. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253(), at 54-56 (1985), reprinted in I986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2836-2838;
H.R. REP. No. 9 9 -253 (V), at 3-4 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124,3126-3127.
53. Lee, supra note 48.
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Supreme Court ruling to this effect thus runs counter to CERCLA's
broad remedial purpose of ensuring rapid responses to the threats posed
by hazardous sites.'
Moreover, Congress did not intend for the EPA to perform the
majority of clean-ups that occur under CERCLA 5 While in some
instances the EPA may ultimately perform the clean-up job and recover
its response costs, under CERCLA's statutory scheme, EPA clean-up is a
last resort. 6 Congress intended only for EPA clean-ups to occur only
after a failure of voluntary private action. 7
Disallowing contribution actions between PRPs in the absence of
action under section io6 or section io7 would also slow the reallocation
of clean-up costs from less culpable PRPs to more culpable PRPs,
diminish incentives for PRPs to voluntarily report contamination to state
agencies 8 and discourage the voluntary expenditure of PRP funds on
clean-up activities.59 "Ordinarily, the current operator of the site is the
party best able to respond quickly and efficiently" to the EPA's clean-up
and remediation requests, or to arrange for the clean-up, even if it did
not create the problemo Under the current state of the law, after the
current operator of the property cleans up the contaminated property it
may then sue other PRPs in contribution, forcing PRPs to pay their fair
share of the clean-up costs. The CERCLA right of contribution between
PRPs, independent of action under section io6 or section I07,
"encourages the current operator to move swiftly, and then obtain
contribution from other responsible parties.",6, If the current operator
loses its independent contribution right, it will also "lose its incentive to
undertake a voluntary response," and may prefer to instead "wait and let
the government perform the [clean-up] work.
62
The EPA thus has a fundamental interest in the interpretation of the
timing of contribution claims under CERCLA because of its duties as
enforcer and promoter of the statute. A Supreme Court limitation on
PRP independent contribution rights would severely restrict the EPA's
statutory duties to promote fast and effective clean-ups.
54. H.R. REP. No. 96-1io6(1), at i (I98O), reprinted in 198o U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20,6132.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd, 804 F.2d 1454, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
5& Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 67, 690 (5th Cir. 2002).
59L See e.g., Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1465 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
6o. Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
6I. Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
6z Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
201
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
C. THE UNITED STATES' INTERESTS AS A POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION
DEFENDANT APPEAR TO OUTWEIGH THE UNITED STATES' INTERESTS AS
CERCLA ENFORCER
Disappointingly, despite the federal government's role as an entity
charged with effectuating CERCLA's statutory purpose of prompt
environmental clean-up, the DOJ's position throughout the Aviall
controversy appears primarily designated to defend the potential
contribution defendant.63 Although the DOJ's argument hints at the
United States' competing CERCLA policy considerations, it
nevertheless portrays the United States' interests as a CERCLA
defendant as more compelling than the United States' interest as an
enforcer of the CERCLA statute.64 On January 9, 2004, less than one
month after the DOJ filed its amicus brief in support of certiorari, the
Supreme Court agreed to review Aviall to address the timing CERCLA
contribution actions.
65
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR A SUPREME COURT RULING AFFIRMING THE
EN BANC A VIALL DECISION AND THE INDEPENDENT RIGHT OF
CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE PARTIES
A. LEGAL AUTHORITY SUPPORTS A SUPREME COURT RULING
AFFIRMING AVIALL
From a legal standpoint, the Supreme Court should rule against the
DOJ brief and affirm the Aviall en banc panel decision because the en
banc panel's reasoning is in harmony with federal common law, as well as
the legislative history of section 113(f), public policy, and CERCLA
practice. Moreover, courts of appeals consistently interpret CERCLA to
allow private contribution actions, CERCLA case law is not in conflict
on this issue, and the state of the law allowing private contribution
actions under CERCLA is fairly settled.
63. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc.,
124 S.Q. 981 (2004) (No. 02-1192), 2003 WL 22977858, (U.S. Dec. 12, 2003). See also Second Brief of
Amicus Curiae United States at 28, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 124 S.Ct. 981 (2004) (No.
02-1192), WL 354181 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2004). The DOJ position is consistent with general Bush
Administration environmental policy lobbying for DOD exemptions from environmental regulation to
improve military readiness. In 2002 and 2003, Congress exempted DOD from the Endangered Species
Act, the Marine Mammal Act, and Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Although Congress refused to grant
DOD exemptions from the Clean Air Act, CERCLA, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act first in 2002, and again in 2003, the Pentagon continues to pursue exemptions from these
environmental laws in 2004. See Elizabeth Shogren, Pentagon Appeals to White House on Pollution
Linits, LA. TIMEs, Jan. 15,2oo4, at At6.
64- See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc.,
124 S.Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 02-1192), 2003 WL 22977858 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2003). See also Second Brief of
Amicus Curiae United States at 28, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 124 S.Ct. 981 (2004) (No.
02-1192), WL 3 5418i (U.S. Feb. 23, 2004).
65. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., i24 S. at. 98I (Jan. 9, 2004).
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i. The Aviall En Banc Decision is Consistent With CERCLA's
Broad Remedial Purpose
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 "to facilitate the prompt clean-
up of hazardous waste sites and to shift the cost of environmental
response from the taxpaV ers to the parties who benefited from the wastes
that caused the harm." In enacting CERCLA, Congress established a
nationwide regulatory scheme to ensure rapid responses to the threats
posed by improperly managed hazardous sites, to encourage the
voluntary clean-up of those sites, and to make certain that those
responsible for the problems bear the costs of the clean-up. CERCLA
levied new taxes on the sale of chemical feedstocks and petroleum, and
created a "Superfund" to finance the statute's ambitious goals and pay
for the clean-up of abandoned hazardous sites.68
Section I04 of CERCLA authorizes the federal government-
through the EPA-to clean-up contaminated sites, and establishes
procedures and requirements for removal or remedial actions by the
EPA.69 When the EPA determines that an actual or threatened release of
hazardous substances presents an "imminent or substantial
endangerment to health or the environment," the EPA may issue an
abatement order to the responsible party compelling clean-up pursuant
to section io6(a), or go to federal district court to obtain such an order.7'
CERCLA authorizes the EPA to bring suit or obtain injunctive relief
against PRPs that fail to obey the EPA's section io6 administrative
orders to compel clean-up.7'
Alternatively, the EPA may conduct the clean-up of the
contaminated site itself, using funds from the Superfund for sites
designated for clean-up by the EPA on the National Priorities List. Once
the federal government or a state agency has incurred clean-up costs
under the statute, it may obtain reimbursement of its actual costs
incurred in performing the clean-up by initiating a cost recovery action
against PRPs under section Io7(a).7" Responsible parties under section
Io7(a) are ultimately liable for removal and remediation costs.7 Private
66. OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., ii6 F.3d 1574, 15 78 (5th Cir. 1997).
67. 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 61 I9, 61 I9-20, 6132 (1980).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 9631, repealed by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-499, § 517(c)(I), ioo Stat. 1613, 1774 (1986).
69. Id § 9604.
70. ld § 96o6(a).
71. lId §96o6(a), (b)(I).
72. ld § 96o7.
73. Id Title 42 U.S.C. § 96o7(a)(I)-(4) provides four categories of persons who are liable to the
EPA for clean-up costs unless they are able to invoke one of CERCLA's enumerated defenses: (i)
owners and operators of facilities at which hazardous substances have come to be located; (2) certain
past owners and operators of such facilities; (3) persons who arranged for the disposal or treatment of
hazardous substances; and (4) certain transporters of hazardous substances to the site.
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parties who respond to problems at facilities covered by CERCLA can
also seek cost recovery from statutorily defined responsible parties.74
Section I07(a) of CERCLA creates a powerful cost-recovery mechanism
for the EPA: in addition to CERCLA's no-fault liability terms, liability is
also joint and several under section I07(a) if two or more parties have
contributed to a single indivisible harm.75
Although section 107 of CERCLA gives the EPA the broad power
to initiate remediation and clean-up actions itself, the EPA's role in
clean-up and remediation efforts under the statute is limited: EPA's
dwindling funding makes it impossible for the agency to single-handedly
remediate the many contaminated sites throughout the country.
6
Responsible parties often help fund many CERCLA clean-ups.
Currently, two-thirds of contaminated sites that are not federal property
are actually cleaned up with money from responsible companies.' The
preservation of an independent section I13 contribution right between
responsible parties is thus essential to promote CERCLA's broad
remedial purpose. Allowing responsible parties to independently seek
contribution from other PRPs both generates money for the clean-up, as
well as ensures that responsibility for the harm will be allocated more
fairly between the responsible parties.
State clean-up funds can also help remediate smaller sites that are
not on the national priorities list." These funds, however, are limited and
often only finance clean-ups where responsible parties fail to take
remedial action.79 For these smaller sites, an independent right of
contribution is also essential. By bringing more money into the clean-up
pot, independent contribution can actually provide the main source of
funding to effectuate state-sponsored clean-ups where none existed
previously.
CERCLA's clean-up and remediation mechanisms are particularly
powerful because CERCLA liability applies to the federal government
when it is responsible for hazardous pollution. Although "[t]he United
States, as a sovereign, is immune from suit,"' Section 120 of CERCLA
contains a sovereign immunity waiver, subjecting the federal government
and its agencies to removal and remedial actions under the statute.8' A
74- Id§ 96o7(a)(4)(B).
75. United States v. RW. Meyer, 889 F.2d 1497, 15o6-o8 (6th Cr. 1989).
76. Lee, supra note 48.
77. Id.
78. See, for example, California's Hazardous Substance Account Act, which provides for state
response and remedial action and finances the containment and clean-up of releases of hazardous
substances where potentially responsible parties fail to undertake remedial action. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 25350-25359 (West 2000).
79 See id.
80. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S 584,586 (94i).
81. Title 42 U.S.C. § 962o(a)(i), the sovereign immunity waiver of CERCLA, provides:
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second provision in the sovereign immunity waiver goes even further and
subjects the United States to state liability under CERCLA. Section
12o(a)(4) provides that if the federal government cleans up contaminated
property pursuant to CERCLA, the federal government must use the
clean-up standards of the state in which the ,clean-up occurs, thereby
subjecting the United States to state law under the statute.82 CERCLA's
sovereign immunity waiver is crucial to the broad remedial purpose
underlying the statute. The sovereign immunity waiver assures other
CERCLA defendants that the United States is liable for its share of the
clean-up costs throughout the remediation process.
To effectuate CERCLA's broad remedial purpose of ensuring rapid
responses to hazardous sites, and shifting clean-up costs from the
taxpayers to the parties who benefited from the wastes that caused the
harm, the Supreme Court should affirm the Aviall en banc decision and
independent contribution rights. A ruling to the contrary would slow
CERCLA hazardous site clean-ups, as well as discourage voluntary
clean-ups and fail to fairly allocate costs between responsible parties.
2. The Aviall En Banc Decision Is Consistent With the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
Although as enacted CERCLA did not contain an explicit provision
allowing recovery through private contribution actions, many federal
courts read an implied right of contribution into the statute, allowing
PRPs who incurred clean-up costs in excess of their fair share to sue
other PRPs for contribution. Congress codified the right to contribution
in 1986 through the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 ("SARA") "to ensure rapid and thorough clean-up of abandoned
hazardous waste sites.i ''  SARA explicitly provided a right of
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States (including the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government) shall be subject to, and comply
with, this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and
substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 96o7 of this
title. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the liability of any person or entity
under sections 96o6 and 9607 of this title.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) provides:
State laws concerning removal and remedial action, including State laws regarding
enforcement, shall apply to removal and remedial action at facilities owned or operated by
a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States or facilities that are.., not
included on the National Priorities List. The preceding sentence shall not apply to the
extent a state law would apply any standard or requirement to such facilities which is more
stringent than the standards and requirements applicable to facilities which are not owned
or operated by any such department, agency or instrumentality.
83. See Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., I53 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998)
(collecting cases).
84. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of I986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, lOO
Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 96o-75). See also H.R.
REP. No. 99-253(I), at 54-56 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2836-38; H.R. REP. No. 99-
25 3 (V), at 3-4 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3126-27; IHLR. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 55
(i985), reprinted in i986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2837.
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contribution for PRPs,85 as well as added a statute of limitations for
CERCLA actions.86 Pre-SARA Supreme Court decisions casting doubt
upon the ability of the federal courts to fashion implied rights of
contribution under federal statutes were in part responsible for
Congress' enactment of an express statutory provision for contribution
via section 113(f). 87
In order to further CERCLA's broad remedial purposes of
facilitating prompt clean-up of hazardous waste sites and shifting the cost
of environmental response from the taxpayers to the parties who
benefited from the wastes that caused the harm, CERCLA's section
113(f) encourages privatesparties to seek contribution from other liable
parties for clean-up costs. Section 113(f)(I) provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is
liable or potentially liable under section 96o7(a) of this title, during or
following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or 96o7(a) of
this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by
Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate
response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall
diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in
the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section
9607 of this title.8'
The last sentence of section 113(f), emphasizing that "nothing in
[section I 13(f)] shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action
for contribution in the absence of a civil action," underscores the
rationale of the en banc panel's decision in favor of independent
contribution actions between PRPs. Congress' explicit intent to codify an
independent right of contribution through SARA in section 113(f) is
therefore consistent with a Supreme Court ruling in favor of Aviall and
independent contribution between PRPs generally.
3. The Legislative History of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act Supports Independent Contribution Actions
Between Potentially Responsible Parties
Additionally, SARA's legislative history, although somewhat
ambiguous, ultimately supports that PRPs should be able to seek
contribution independent of either section io6 orders or section 107 cost
85. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of I986 § I13(f), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f) (2o0o).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (codifying a six year statute of limitations for a cost-recovery action and a
three year statute of limitations for a contribution action).
87. See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc, 451 U.S. 63o, 639-40 (198i); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Tramp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77,91-95 (981).
88. OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th Cir. '997); Bell
Petroleum Servs., Inc. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F-3d 889, 894-97 (5th Cir. 1993).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
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recovery suits. Specifically, SARA legislative history provides that
section 113(f) "confirms a Federal right of contribution" and "clarifies
and confirms the right of a person held jointly and severally liable under
CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable parties."'9
First, the legislative history of SARA supports PRP contribution in
the absence of section io6 or section i07 action because Congress
intended to give PRPs the "explicit right to sue" for contribution and
"confirm" the decisions of the federal courts that had so construed
CERCLA.9" For example, during the drafting of section I13(f), Senator
Stafford emphasized that section 1 13(f) would "remove any doubt as to
the right of contribution," thus highlighting Congress' commitment to
contribution actions between PRPs in drafting section 113(f).'
Second, the legislative history of SARA supports PRP contribution
in the absence of section io6 or section I07 action because Congress
emphasized that through SARA it encouraged federal courts to develop
reasonable solutions for apportioning waste site clean-up costs among
numerous PRPs.' Liability under CERCLA is "strict... [as well as,]
[w]here appropriate... joint and several, as a matter of federal common
law."'9 Congress deleted "explicit mention of joint and several liability
from CERCLA in i98o to allow courts to establish the scope of liability
through a case-by-case application" of evolving common law, and pre-
existing statutory law, and did not intend to eliminate these theories of
liability from CERCLA simply because they were not included in the
statute.95
Although the record contains statements suggesting that Congress
intended contribution actions to occur only after the initiation of either
section io6 or section i07 actions, these statements pertain to different
versions of section 113(f) that Congress ultimately did not adopt.
96
Accordingly, the legislative history of SARA, although somewhat
ambiguous, ultimately supports that PRPs should be able to seek
contribution in the absence of either section io6 or section 107 actions
under CERCLA.
4. The Aviall En Banc Decision is Consistent with Federal
Contribution Case Law After SARA
After Congress enacted SARA in 1986, courts of appeals
9o . H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 79 (1985), reprinted in i986 U.S.C.C.AN. 2835, 2861; S. REP. No.
99- 1, at 44 (1985).
9i . HR. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 59, 79, reprinted in j986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2841, 2861.
92. 131 CONG. REc. 24, 450 (1985) (statement of Sen. Stafford).
93. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 74, reprinted in I986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, I51 (5th Cir. 20oi) (Wiener, J.,
dissenting), rev'd en banc, 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002).
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consistently recognized CERCLA contribution claims in the absence of
section io6 or section lO7 action. In numerous published decisions,
federal circuit courts either allowed actions for contribution to proceed
in the absence of a prior or pending federal CERCLA civil action, or
indicated in dicta that a prior or pending CERCLA action is not a
prerequisite for bringing a contribution suit.' The Second, Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits allow contribution suits under
section I 13(f) in the absence of CERCLA section io6 or section 107
action.0 In dicta, the First Circuit also indicated that a prior or pending
CERCLA action is not a prerequisite for bringing a contribution suit.'
Additionally, few federal courts of appeals have parsed the language
of section 113(f) as explicitly as the initial Aviall three-judge panel to
come to their conclusions that a prior or pending section io6 or section
io7 actions is not a prerequisite for contribution suits under section
113 .1  Before Cooper Industries proposed its statutory interpretation
argument to limit CERCLA contribution suits, only isolated dicta existed
to support its conclusion.'"' The Aviall en banc panel emphasized that
97. See Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 688 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert.
granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 02-1192).
9& See, e.g., W. Props. Serv. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3 d 678,683 (9th Cir. 20o4) (emphasizing
that the Ninth Circuit allows parties to seek contribution, absent a CERCLA section lo6 or io7(a)
action against the party); Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 299 F.3 d IOI9, 1024 (9th Cir.
2002) (reporting that owner sued other PRPs for damages to cover expenses of investigating soil
pollution in the absence of any indication that the owner was sued beforehand); Morrison Enters. v.
McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1130-31 (ioth Cir. 2002) (finding that after state agency ordered
Morrison to investigate contamination, Morrison hired consulting firm, then sued McShares for
contribution under CERCLA); Crofton Ventures Ltd. P'ship v. G & H P'ship, 258 F.3 d 292, 294-95
(4th Cir. 2001) (reporting that Crofton Ventures notified state agency of contamination, cleaned up
facility under agency's "supervision," then sued for contribution under section 113(0); Kalamazoo
River Study Group v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 274 F.3d 1O43, lo46 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that companies
entered into consent order with state agency to fund remedial investigation and feasibility study, then
sued other companies for contribution under CERCLA); Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416,421-
22 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that after negotiations with state agency, Bedford Affiliates agreed in
consent order to begin clean-up, in course of which Bedford commenced action for contribution);
PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams, Co., 151 F.3d 61o, 613 (7 th Cir. 1998) (finding that after state agency
"required" PMC to clean-up site, PMC brought suit for contribution under section 113(0); United
States v. Colo. & E. R.R. Co., 5o F.3 d 1530, 15 3 6 (IOth Cir. 1995) (holding that as parties are PRPs "by
virtue of their past or present ownership of the site.., any claim that would reapportion costs between
these parties is the quintessential claim for contribution"); cf. Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53
F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that Control Data reported findings of contamination to state
agency, entered into consent decree with agency requiring it to investigate, monitor, and clean up
contamination, installed remediation system, and then sued defendants for contribution); Wickland
Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc, 792 F.2d 887, 889, 893 (9 th Cir. i986) (allowing cost recovery action
to proceed where state agency required site owner to test waste substances and owner sued prior
owner for costs incurred during testing).
99 See United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc, 33 F.3d 96, 99 n.8 (ist Cir. I994).
ioo. Aviall, 312 F.3d at 688 (en banc).
roI. See OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 158o (Sth Cir. 1997)
("A [S]ection 113(f ) contribution action is derivative of an action under [Slection io7(a), if only a
pending one."); Rumpke of Ind., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 1o7 F.3d 1235, 1241 (7th Cir. 1997)
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this supported a broader reading of contribution:
Given the enormous monetary exposure and the volume of litigation
surrounding CERCLA ... , one must assume that talented attorneys
have had sufficient incentive and opportunity to explore statutory
lacunae such as those created by a cramped reading of § 113(9g!)....
The absence of direct precedent is like the dog that didn't bark.
Federal appeals court case law after Congress' codification of the
right to contribution supports a reading of the statute consistent with that
of the Aviall en banc panel allowing Aviall to recover its fair share of the
clean-up costs from Cooper Industries.
CERCLA's broad remedial purpose, federal common law, the
legislative history of section 113(f), and CERCLA practice support an
independent right of action under CERCLA. As courts of appeals
consistently interpret CERCLA to allow private contribution actions,
CERCLA case law is not in conflict on this issue, and the state of the law
allowing private contribution actions under CERCLA is fairly settled,
the Supreme Court should affirm the en banc panel's ruling in favor of
Aviall Services.
B. PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS A SUPREME COURT RULING AFFIRMING
AVIALL BECAUSE A CONTRARY RULE WOULD EFFECTIVELY IMMUNIZE
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FROM SUBSTANTIAL CERCLA LIABILITY,
AND ALTERNATIVE STATE AND FEDERAL REMEDIES Do NOT PROVIDE
ADEQUATE OR RELIABLE REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE PARTIES TO HOLD THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LIABLE FOR ITS HAZARDOUS POLLUTION
I. Public Policy Supports a Supreme Court Ruling Affirming
Aviall Because a Contrary Rule Would Effectively Immunize the
Federal Government from Substantial CERCLA Liability.
The Supreme Court should also rule in favor of Aviall for public
policy reasons. A Supreme Court holding against independent
contribution rights would narrow CERCLA's sovereign immunity waiver
and drastically limit the federal government's liability under the
statute.'" Although CERCLA plainly waives sovereign immunity for
claims brought under its provisions, CERCLA does not generally waive
immunity from claims made against the United States under state law.'0
In Maine v. Department of the Navy, then-Chief Judge Breyer held that
CERCLA section 12o(a)(4), does not waive the federal government's
(stating that CERCLA "appears" to require that an action under section io6 or section Io7(a) be
"ongoing or already completed" before section 113(0(1) is available but noting that such a reading of
the statute "seems to provide a disincentive for parties voluntarily to undertake cleanup operations").
lo2- Aviall, 312 F.3d at 689 (en banc).
103. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Lockheed Martin Corp., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs.,
Inc., 124 S.Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 02-1192), 2004 WL 759685, at *24 (U.S. Apr. 8, 2004).
lO4. See Maine v. Dep't of Navy, 973 F.2d Ioo7, iolo-iI (ist Cr. 1992).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
sovereign immunity from state civil penalties and environmental
statutes. IO5
At best, CERCLA's sovereign immunity waiver applies only to state
claims concerning facilities currently owned and operated by the federal
government, and does not apply to facilities owned and operated by the
federal government in the past.'06 As a result, claims against the federal
government arising from the toxic pollution of formerly owned federal
facilities may be barred.
Additionally, because the Supreme Court has stated that a waiver of
sovereign immunity must be construed narrowly in favor of the United
States," it is likely that state claims against the federal government for
the clean-up of facilities currently owned and operated by the United
States would be barred, leaving the federal government immune from
state environmental clean up statutes.
If the Supreme Court accepts the interpretation of Cooper
Industries and the DOJ, claims against the United States arising from the
pollution of formerly owned facilities will be barred, and state claims
arising from the federal government's off-site waste disposal will also be
precluded. If CERCLA does not provide a contribution remedy for
PRPs independent of section io6 and section i07 actions, much federal
pollution will be entirely outside the reach of state contribution statutes.
Accordingly, parties who clean up sites pursuant to state directives, or
through state voluntary clean-up plans, will be unable to sue the United
States for contribution. As a result, the United States will only be subject
to liability for claims arising out of prior section io6 or section 107
actions under CERCLA.
Limitations on the United States' liability under CERCLA are a
very real concern to companies doing business with the DOD and other
federal agencies. For example, Lockheed Martin Corporation's amicus
brief in support of Aviall and independent contribution rights
emphasizes the implications that a ruling in favor of Aviall would have
on the United States' CERCLA liability% and on companies doing
business with the federal government.' Lockheed Martin is an
aeronautics and defense company that conducts approximately eighty
percent of its business with the United States Department of Defense
and other federal agencies, and owns and operates a number of facilities
formerly owned or operated by the federal government." Lockheed
IO5 . Id.
io6. Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F.Supp. 224, 227-28 (W.D.Mich. '993); Redland
Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the Army of the United States, 8oi F.Supp. 1432, 1436-37 (M.D. Pa.
1992).
io7. United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1993).
io8. Brief of Anicus Curiae Lockheed Martin Corp. at * I-2, Aviall (No. 02-1192).
io Id. at* *i.
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Martin has spent millions of dollars implementing voluntary remediation
programs in reliance upon its right under CERCLA to recover response
costs from other responsible parties, especially the federal government.' 0
If the Supreme Court deemed an independent recovery right
unavailable, Lockheed Martin's incentive to engage in voluntary clean-
ups would be significantly reduced. Companies engaged in voluntary
remediation activity would be forced "unjustly and unjustifiably" to bear
clean-up and remediation costs attributable to other parties."'
2. Public Policy Supports a Supreme Court Ruling Affirming
Aviall Because Alternative State and Federal Remedies Do Not
Provide Adequate or Reliable Remedies for Private Parties to
Hold the Federal Government Liable for Its Hazardous
Pollution
The Supreme Court should also rule in favor of Aviall because state
hazardous substance laws do not provide adequate or reliable remedies
for private parties to hold the federal government liable for its hazardous
pollution. State laws are inconsistent and of little use against the United
States, which has asserted that sovereign immunity bars such claims.
While the applicable federal statutes may open the federal government
to suit from private parties in federal court, the Federal Tort Claims Act
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act do not contain
provisions that are easily applicable to private party contribution actions
resulting from the voluntary clean-up of contaminated property.
a. State Laws Do Not Provide Adequate or Reliable Remedies
for Private Parties to Hold the Federal Government Liable
for Its Hazardous Pollution
Congress largely created CERCLA because of the need for national
uniformity in dealing with hazardous sites."2 To discourage businesses
dealing in hazardous substances "from locating primarily in states with
more lenient laws," Congress sought to encourage the development of a
federal CERCLA common law for determining liability under the
statute."3 Deferring to state law for contribution claims between PRPs
would run expressly counter to Congress' intent in drafting CERCLA,
and frustrate the statute's objective of guaranteeing a specific response
when a hazardous clean-up becomes necessary."4 Deferring to state law
for contribution claims between PRPs would also fail to mitigate the
negative effects of a Supreme Court holding in favor of Cooper
iio. Id. at i-2.
iii. Id. at *2.
H2. 126 CONG. REC. 31,965 (1980).
113. Id. (reporting statement by Rep. Florio, CERCLA's House sponsor, discussing the dangers of
businesses dealing in hazardous substances locating in states with more lenient laws).




Industries and the federal government. In addition to the likelihood that
the United States will assert sovereign immunity to bar its exposure to
state law contribution claims, as it has in other federal contribution
contexts."5 Many state laws do not contain provisions for contribution
actions at all. For example, citizens of Mississippi who voluntarily clean
up polluted sites will have no right of contribution in the absence of
federal CERCLA intervention, because Mississippi does not recognize a
right of contribution for costs spent to remediate polluted facilities."
6
Additionally, few states limit contribution before the party seeking
contribution has been subjected to judgment. As of 2000, six states,
including Texas, had "contribution statutes limited to contribution
between judgment debtors.' '"7 States that do allow contribution before
the party seeking contribution has been subjected to judgment follow
very different substantive and procedural rules, making it difficult for
out-of-state parties to correctly engineer a contribution claim. '
In Texas, in the absence of federal intervention, the United States
and state and local governments may be protected from liability by
sovereign immunity under state statutes. The Texas Solid Waste Disposal
Act, while recognizing a right of contribution for hazardous clean-ups
under Texas law, does not contain a sovereign immunity waiver for state
or other governmental entities, and the state has formally recognized
waste disposal as a "governmental function," typically protected by
sovereign immunity."9
If, in the absence of a CERCLA independent right of contribution
CERCLA, Aviall were to amend its complaint and file a suit against
115. See OSI, Inc. v. United States, 285 F.3d 947, 953 (iith Cir. 2002) (holding that waste disposal
decisions constitute discretionary functions that involve an element of judgment or choice and
therefore are subject to the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act waiver of
the federal government's sovereign immunity); Aragon v. United States, 146 F.3d 819, 827 (Ioth Cir.
1998) (same).
116. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 17-17-29(4) ('995).
Any person creating, or responsible for creating, through misadventure, happenstance, or
otherwise, an immediate necessity for remedial or clean-up action involving solid waste
shall be liable for the cost of such remedial or clean-up action and the commission may
recover the cost of same by a civil action brought in the circuit court of the county in which
venue may lie.
Id.
II7. RESTATEMENT (TImRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 23 reporter's note, cmt. a, at
292 (2000) (explaining that six states have "contribution statutes limited to contribution between
judgment debtors").
ii. Id. at 291-92 (describing six categories of state contribution statutes and identifying two states
that "recognize contribution without a statute"); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(I) (2000) (providing that
CERCLA contribution claims "be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law").
I19. See City of Corpus Christi v. Absolute Indus., 120 S.W.3d i, 3 (Tex. App. 2001); see also TEx.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215 (Vernon 1997) (listing solid waste disposal as a
"governmental function").
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Cooper in Texas state court, Aviall's contribution recovery from Cooper
would be virtually impossible because contribution in Texas is limited to
contribution between judgment debtors. Aviall could only recover from
Cooper in Texas if both parties were codefendants in a suit, and a verdict
were rendered against them jointly. Aviall would have been better off if
it had not voluntarily cleaned up the property at all. Based on Texas state
law, Aviall would have more likely paid its fair share of the site's clean-
up costs if it had waited for Texas state authorities to sue the two parties
jointly for the costs of cleaning up the property.
If Cooper were the DOD, Aviall would also be unable to recover its
clean-up costs. In addition to the contribution hurdles presented by
Texas state law, the United States could assert its sovereign immunity to
defeat liability under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act as it has under
other federal statutes like the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Deferring to state law for contribution claims between PRPs would
run expressly counter to Congress' intent in drafting CERCLA, and
lessen the opportunity for PRPs to recover in contribution at all.
Uniformity with respect to CERCLA contribution is necessary to
"prevent the vagaries of differing state laws from affecting the incentive
for [PRPs to conduct] voluntary clean-up[s]."'..
b. Other Federal Statutes Do Not Provide Adequate or
Reliable Remedies for Private Parties to Hold the Federal
Government Liable for its Hazardous Pollution
Other federal environmental statutes are not viable alternatives to
CERCLA contribution actions, and do not provide adequate remedies
under which private parties can recover clean-up costs from the federal
government for its toxic pollution. While the applicable federal statutes
may open the federal government to suit from private parties in federal
court, the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act do not contain provisions that are easily applicable to the
cost recovery of a private party's voluntary clean-up of contaminated
property.
(i) The Federal Tort Claims Act
The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FICA") provides that the United
States is liable for negligence in the same manner and to the same extent
as would be a private individual under like circumstances."' As the
FTCA contains a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign
immunity,'22 at first glance the FTCA appears to be a viable means for
private parties to recover clean-up costs from the United States for its
120. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 8o4 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9 th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000).
122. Powers v. United States, 996 F.2d 1121, 1124(iith Cir. 1993).
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toxic pollution.
But in order to recover from the United States under the FrCA, the
United States' actions in dumping hazardous substances must be "a
negligent act" under state law.'23 The FTCA carries a higher burden of
proof than a private CERCLA contribution action. Plaintiffs must prove
the elements of a claim for negligence in order to recover from the
United States, a particularly daunting task in light of the virtual
impossibility of proving causation in a large "chemical stew" pollution
situation.
Additionally, in contrast to CERCLA, which has a three-year statute
of limitations for contribution actions,'24 the statute of limitations under
the FTCA is two years. 25 The FTCA's shorter statute of limitations
further restricts the time in which a private party, assuming it was able to
prove the United States' negligence, could file a complaint under the act.
The difficulties inherent in proving causation under the FTCA, as well as
the FTCA's shorter statute of limitations make the FFCA a less ideal
alternative to a private contribution action against the United States
under CERCLA.
(ii) The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") is also
not a viable federal statutory alternative to CERCLA contribution under
which private parties may recover clean-up costs from the United States
for its toxic pollution. 126 RCRA
permits a private party to bring suit against certain responsible
persons, including former owners, 'who halve] contributed or who...
are] contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment.'27
Unlike CERCLA, however, "RCRA is not principally designed to
effectuate the clean-up of toxic waste sites or to compensate those who
have attended to the remediation of environmental hazards."' RCRA's
primary purpose is to "reduce the generation of hazardous waste and to
ensure the proper treatment, storage, and disposal of that waste which is
nonetheless generated, 'so as to minimize the present and future threat
123. Plaza Speedway, Inc. v. United States, No. 97-I346-WEB, 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 25017, at *28
(D. Kan. Apr. 12, 2001).
124. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986 § 113(g), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(g) (2000).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000).
126. See Resource Conversation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972
0994).
127. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc, 516 U.S. 479,484 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(I)(B)).
12& 1d. at 483.
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to human health and the environment."'
The Supreme Court emphasized in Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.
that RCRA's citizen suit provision "was not intended to provide a
remedy for past clean-up costs.""'3 RCRA contains a timing restriction
which provides that a party may only bring suit upon a showing that the
hazardous waste at issue presents "an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment.'' 3 The Court concluded
that the language of RCRA "implies that there must be a threat which is
present now, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until
later.""'3 It follows, then, that Congress designed RCRA to provide a
remedy that ameliorates present harms or reduces the risk of possible
future harms, not compensates for past clean-up efforts.
Even if parties were to sue the United States under RCRA before
they cleaned up the contaminated property, the statute would still not
provide an effective alternative to independent contribution actions
under CERCLA. In addition to the RCRA requirement that a private
suit must properly allege an "imminent and substantial endangerment to
health and the environment,' 33 which can only occur if the harm
"threaten[s] to occur immediately,"'" 3 RCRA presents other hurdles to
its functioning as a cost recovery mechanism. A private party may not
bring suit under RCRA without first giving notice to the EPA, the state
in which the endangerment may occur, and to potential defendants. 35
Additionally, no citizen suit can proceed if either the EPA or the state
has commenced, and is diligently prosecuting, a separate enforcement
action.' Therefore, as the Meghrig court emphasized,
if RCRA were designed to compensate private parties... it would be a
wholly irrational mechanism for doing so. Those parties with
insubstantial problems, problems that neither the State nor the Federal
Government feel compelled to address, could recover their response
costs, whereas those parties whose waste problems were sufficiently
severe as to attract the attention of Government officials would be left
without a recovery.'37
Accordingly, RCRA does not provide a viable federal statutory
alternative for PRPs to recover clean-up costs from the United States.
I29L Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (20oo0)).
130. Id. at485.
131. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(I)(B) (2000).
132. Id. at 486 (quoting Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d IOll, IOI9 (9th Cir. I994)).
133. Id. at 485 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(I)(B))
134. Id. at 485 (quoting WEBSTER's DICTONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1245 (2d ed. 1934))
(alterations in original).
135. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 § 7002,42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(I)(B),
(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (2000).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B), (C).
137. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486-87.
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CONCLUSION
On review of Aviall, the Supreme Court should hold that CERCLA
provides a mechanism for potentially responsible parties to collect clean-
up costs from each other in section i13 private contribution actions,
independent of EPA administrative orders to compel clean-up under
section io6(a) or cost recovery actions under section Io7(a)(4)(A). The
risk of long-term damage to the environment is compelling: if the Court
accepts the arguments of Cooper Industries and the Department of
Justice, the federal government will become virtually absolved from
immunity waiver. State and federal environmental law will not provide
adequate alternative remedies under which PRPs may recover clean-up
costs from the United States for its hazardous pollution. The Department
of Defense, the world's biggest polluter, may gain near absolute
immunity from contribution claims, being subject only to those claims
arising out of section io6 or section io7 actions under CERCLA-claims
that are in the direct control of each administration. Although this result
does produce a short-term gain for the public purse, the long-term effects
of a Supreme Court decision in favor of Cooper Industries have
significant ramifications for public and environmental health and well-
being.
Not only would a Supreme Court ruling in favor of Cooper
Industries virtually exempt the federal government from liability for
toxic pollution, it would also limit the efficacy of the statute and carry
serious ramifications for the CERCLA liability scheme as a whole. A
Supreme Court ruling reversing the Aviall en banc decision would slow
the reallocation of clean-up costs from less culpable PRPs to more
culpable PRPs, diminish incentives for PRPs to voluntarily report
contamination to state agencies, and discourage the voluntary
expenditure of PRP funds on clean-up activities.
To ensure that the United States remains liable under CERCLA for
its disposal of hazardous pollution, and to protect CERCLA's general
efficacy and integrity, the Supreme Court should affirm the Fifth
Circuit's ruling in Aviall and hold that CERCLA provides a mechanism
for potentially responsible parties to collect clean-up costs from each
other independent of EPA administrative orders to compel clean-up or
cost recovery actions.
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